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NOTE 
Churches Built on Sinking Sand: How 
Courts Decide Who Keeps Church Property 
Following a Schism  
Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 
575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), transfer denied. 
DANIEL COFFMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With a marked decrease in regular church attendance and the flowering 
of non-denominational churches across the United States,1 traditional hierar-
chical church organizations are losing members in droves.2   Such losses are 
exacerbated when denominations make controversial doctrinal changes, such 
as the ordination of women and homosexual clergy.3  Local members can 
disagree so strongly with the decisions made by their national church that 
they choose to disaffiliate, oftentimes in favor of a denomination that more 
closely resembles their values and beliefs.4  This has led to a flurry of litiga-
tion across the country in which the denomination seeks to retain all of the 
disaffiliating church’s property, normally pursuant to a clause in the denomi-
  
 * B.A. with honors distinction, William Jewell College, 2009; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2014; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri 
Law Review, 2013-14.  I am grateful to Professor Joshua Hawley for his exceptional 
feedback on previous drafts.  Special thanks to Stan Masters for his valuable insight 
into this case in addition to his encouragement and mentorship over the past two 
years.  
 1. See Russell D. Moore, Where Have All the Presbyterians Gone?, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article /SB100014240527487034373045761 
20690548462776.html; Mark Tooley, Another Mainline Implosion, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (May 11, 2011),  http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/267017/another-
mainline-implosion-mark-tooley (estimating that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 
[PCUSA] lost approximately 60,000 members in 2011). 
 2. “The Presbyterian News Service estimates that approximately 100 congrega-
tions have left the [PCUSA] in the last five years.”  Laurie Goodstein, Presbyterians 
Approve Ordination of Gay People, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, http://www. ny-
times.com/2011/05/11/us /11presbyterian.html; see also Tooley, supra note 1. 
 3. See Goodstein, supra note 2. 
 4. PCUSA Report Critical of EPC, New Wineskins, THE LAYMAN ONLINE (Apr. 
22, 2010), http://www.layman.org/newsaf96/. 
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nation’s constitution that purports to create a trust relationship between the 
national and local church.5 
The recent case of Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian  pre-
sented the question of whether a denomination could, relying solely on the 
property-trust clause in the denomination’s constitution, could create a trust 
relationship in which the local congregation held all church property in trust 
for the denomination.6  In this matter of first impression for Missouri, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, applied what courts have called 
the “neutral principles of law” approach, which instructs courts to resolve 
church property disputes using “objective, well-established concepts of trust 
and property law.”7  The court found that a national church’s property-trust 
clause, on its own, did not establish such a relationship.8  With this ruling, the 
Western District established a framework of strict compliance for other Mis-
souri courts to follow. 
This Note will examine whether the “strict title” application of the neu-
tral principles taken by Gashland is a more preferable approach than the in-
terpretation and application of the neutral principles in other jurisdictions.  
This Note will discuss whether Gashland squares with the Supreme Court of 
the United States’ prior decisions involving church property disputes and 
whether Gashland’s strict title approach is most true to the principles set forth 
in the leading case on the issue, Jones v. Wolf.9  This Note will first review 
the facts and holding of Gashland.10  It will then chronicle the history of 
church property jurisprudence in Missouri and the Supreme Court of the 
United States.11  Next, this Note will outline the reasoning of the Gashland 
court.12  Finally, this Note will analyze the dicta in Jones that has led to the 
deep split in how to apply the neutral principles of law approach to church 
property disputes.  Specifically, this Note will advocate for the application of 
the neutral principles approach outlined in Gashland on the basis that it repre-
sents the most accurate reading of Jones and because its application is most in 
line with the Supreme Court of the United States’ First Amendment jurispru-
dence.13  
  
 5. AM. ANGLICAN COUNCIL, THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH: OVERBEARING AND 
UNJUST EPISCOPAL ACTS 22-26, http://www.americananglican.org/ assets/Resources/ 
TEC-Canonical-Abuses.pdf. 
 6. See Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 575 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012), transfer denied; see also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 456.4, 407.2 
(2000). 
 7. Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 
(1979)). 
 8. Id. at 591-93. 
 9. 443 U.S. 595. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Parts III.A, B. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Gashland Presbyterian Church (Gashland) was incorporated in August 
of 1948 and subsequently deeded a piece of real property by the Presbytery of 
Kansas City.14  “The grantee [was] identified in the Corporation Warranty 
Deed as ‘Gashland Community Church, Gashland, Missouri.’”15  The deed 
stated that the property was granted “to Gashland in exchange for ‘one dollar 
and other good and valuable considerations [sic].’”16  The deed did not re-
serve any “beneficial, reversionary, or remainder interest to any other person 
or entity.”17 
The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (PCUSA) 
identifies itself as an “unincorporated association of ‘[r]eformed Christian 
believers.’”18  PCUSA is comprised of individual churches, such as Gashland, 
that are governed by the churches’ pastors and elders, also known as ses-
sions.19  “Multiple sessions are governed by a district governing body known 
as a presbytery, which is in turn governed by a regional body, the synod.  
Synods are governed by the General Assembly, the highest governing body 
within PCUSA.”20  Before its departure from PCUSA, Gashland fell within 
the purview of Heartland Presbytery.21   
On September 30, 2007, Gashland notified Heartland Presbytery of its 
plans to disaffiliate from PCUSA, taking its property with it.22  Receiving no 
response, on January 14, 2008, Gashland notified Heartland that it had “uni-
laterally disaffiliated” from PCUSA and Heartland in favor of the Evangelical 
Presbyterian Church.23  In response to these letters, Heartland notified Gash-
land that a hearing would be held in April 2008 regarding its request for dis-
missal with property.24  Three days prior to the scheduled hearing, Gashland 
  
 14. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 575, 
577-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), transfer denied.  Gashland “was originally affiliated 
with the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America . . . .  In 1958, the Pres-
byterian Church in the United States of America merged with the United Presbyterian 
Church of North America to form the United Presbyterian Church in the United States 
of America (“UPCUSA”), which in turn merged with the Presbyterian Church in the 
United States in 1983 to form the PCUSA.”  Id. 
 15. Id. at 578. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Brief for Respondent Gashland Presbyterian Church at 4, Gashland, 364 
S.W.3d 575 (No. WD 73064), 2011 WL 1035603 [hereinafter Brief for Gashland].   
 18. Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 578. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.   
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
3
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notified Heartland that it would not participate in the hearing.25  The hearing 
was nonetheless held on April 10, 2008, without Gashland’s participation.26  
After a series of subsequent attempts to engage Gashland, Heartland initiated 
litigation to enforce PCUSA’s purported rights to Gashland’s property.27   
Heartland claimed that, under the “property-trust clause” in PCUSA’s 
Book of Order, Gashland held all church property in trust for the national 
church.28  The “property-trust clause” (located in Section G 8.0201 of the 
Book of Order) stated: 
All property held by or for a particular church, a presbytery, a 
synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 
whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or trustees, 
or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is used 
in programs of a particular church or of a more inclusive governing 
body or retained for the production of income, is held in trust nev-
ertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.).29 
Thus, Heartland argued that disaffiliation with the national church would 
result in Gashland’s forfeiture of all church property in favor of PCUSA.30   
Heartland alleged that Gashland’s membership in PCUSA, along with 
its original Articles of Agreement from 1948 and amended By Laws adopted 
in 1987, showed that Gashland agreed to be bound by PCUSA’s Constitu-
tion.31  Alternatively, Heartland also asserted that PCUSA’s Book of Order, 
standing alone, established a trust and that Missouri trust laws were not appli-
cable to the dispute.32 
In contrast to Heartland’s multitude of trust claims, Gashland asserted 
that under the neutral principles approach, the court must look solely to Mis-
souri trust law in determining whether Gashland held its church property in 
trust for PCUSA.33  Gashland argued that it did not acquiesce in PCUSA’s 
unilateral imposition of a trust and that PCUSA’s Book of Order, standing 
alone, failed to create an express trust under Missouri Law.34  
  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 578-79. 
 27. Id. at 579.  
 28. Id. at 583-84.  
 29. Id. at 578. 
 30. See id.  The Book of Order is considered part of the PCUSA’s Constitution.  
Id. at 578.  
 31. Id. at 583-85, 587-88. 
 32. See id. at 588, 591-92. 
 33. Brief for Gashland, supra note 17, at 10-15.   
 34. Id. at 15-16. 
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The Clay County circuit court dismissed Heartland’s petition with 
prejudice citing Heartland’s failure to state a cause of action.35  The circuit 
court, citing Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi,36 explained that in 
deciding church property disputes, “Missouri courts are prohibited from de-
ferring to religious hierarchy, but must instead use ‘neutral principles’ of law 
in determining the property rights of congregations.”37   
Adopting the “strict title” neutral principles approach, the circuit court 
emphasized that a court will only enforce a trust if it is “embodied in a legally 
cognizable form.”38  Under Missouri law, a trust is only legally cognizable if 
the owner of the property declares that he holds the property as a trustee.39  
The court further established that in order for a trust to be created, the settlor 
must have the capacity to create a trust, “indicate[] an intention to create the 
trust,” and declare as much in a signed writing (for the purposes of creating a 
trust in land).40  The court concluded that the trust provision in PCUSA’s 
Book of Order did not constitute a trust because it was not made by the owner 
of the property, Gashland, and, “to the extent the trust [was] alleged to cover 
Gashland’s real property,” the Denomination’s Book of Order was signed on 
the behalf of, but not by, Gashland.41  The court also rejected Heartland’s 
second contention that the “[d]enomination’s governing documents, including 
its trust and local-church control provisions,” represented a binding contract 
on Gashland.42  Missouri law, the court held, looks “to the governing docu-
ments of local organizations to determine if they have agreed to be bound by 
the provisions of an umbrella organization’s governing documents.”43 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District affirmed the circuit 
court’s dismissal on substantially similar grounds.44  The appellate court first 
affirmed the use of the “‘neutral principles’ approach as the sole method” in 
which to resolve church property disputes in Missouri.45  The court then held 
that a denomination cannot unilaterally create an express trust in local church 
property by means of a property-trust clause in the denomination’s constitu-
tion.46 
  
 35. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, No. 09CY-CV12424, 
2010 WL 5015536 (Clay Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 36. 682 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); see infra Part III.C. 
 37. Heartland Presbytery, 2010 WL 5015536, ¶ 5. 
 38. Id. ¶ 4 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)). 
 39. Id. ¶ 5; see MO. REV. STAT. § 456.4-401(2) (2000).  
 40. Heartland Presbytery, 2010 WL 5015536, ¶ 5; see MO. REV. STAT. § 456.4-
402. 
 41. Heartland Presbytery, 2010 WL 50155366, ¶¶ 5-6. 
 42. Id. ¶ 13. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 575, 595 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012), transfer denied.   
 45. Id. at 581. 
 46. Id. at 583. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To understand the deep divide in how state courts have chosen to re-
solve church property disputes, it is important to understand the vast legal 
history of court involvement in church property disputes.  Much of the juris-
prudence surrounding the resolution of church property cases has been a deli-
cate balancing act.  On one side, courts show a desire to resolve church prop-
erty disputes so as not to close the doors of the court to churches that are 
equally under the protection of the law.47  On the other, courts have been 
wary of interfering with the ability of local churches to submit to the author-
ity of a denomination and all of its dictates, fearing suppression of free exer-
cise.48  A brief history shows how early Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decisions grappled with balancing these two conflicting desires.  The Court in 
Jones v. Wolf sought to settle these questions by advocating use of a neutral 
principles approach that purported to protect the property rights of individual 
churches as well as respect free exercise of religion.49  However, as the latter 
sections of this Part demonstrate, lower courts have taken drastically different 
views on Jones’ meaning of neutral principles and how they are to be ap-
plied.50 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Church Property Disputes 
The 1871 Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Watson v. 
Jones marks the genesis of modern church property disputes.51  The dispute 
in Watson was over the split of a Presbyterian church into pro-slavery and 
abolitionist factions, with the latter representing the majority within the con-
gregation and the former controlling the church governing body (called a 
“session”).52  In Watson, the Court established three rules that have remained 
at the center of all church property disputes.53   
First, the Court held that because churches’ rights of property and con-
tract are “equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their 
members subject to its restraints,” civil courts are required to resolve church 
property disputes.54  The Court went on to state that religious organizations, 
  
 47. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 681 (1871). 
 48. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 610 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 606 (majority opinion). 
 50. See infra Part III.B. 
 51. Watson, 80 U.S. 679. 
 52. Id. at 684. 
 53. Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Re-
ligious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 522 (1990). 
 54. Watson, 80 U.S. at 714.  The deferential approach established in Watson only 
applied to churches that were deemed hierarchical.  Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 
523.  A different framework was established when the church was congregational.  Id.   
6
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like any other voluntary association, are afforded equal protection of the law 
insofar as they have a right to property and freedom to contract.55   
Second, the Court rejected the “departure from doctrine” approach used 
in English common law to resolve internal religious disputes.56  This doctrine 
required the court to determine which of the divisions in a church property 
dispute constituted the “true” congregation by “remain[ing] most loyal to the 
precepts followed at the time the property was donated.”57  The Court rea-
soned that civil courts lacked the competence necessary to resolve disputes 
based on judicial determinations on matters of religious doctrine.58  The Court 
did not rely on the First Amendment, which had yet to be applied to the 
states,59 but based its decision on First Amendment principles purportedly 
found in the federal common law.60  Apart from the Court’s competency con-
cerns, the Court seemed to suggest that the departure from doctrine approach 
would not comport with Jefferson’s fabled “wall of separation” between 
church and state.61 
Finally, in place of the “departure from doctrine” approach, Watson 
adopted a “deferential” or “polity” approach to resolving church property 
disputes.62  This approach instructed civil courts to defer to the decision of the 
highest adjudicatory authority within a hierarchical church in matters “of 
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”63  The Watson 
court reasoned that this hands-off approach was, in light of the free exercise 
and establishment clauses, best suited to maintain the division between 
church and state.64  In a further attempt to keep civil courts out of intra-
church disputes, the Watson court took the position that all members of hier-
archical churches “implicitly submit themselves to the decisionmaking 
authority of the church in ecclesiastical and property matters.”65  Watson es-
tablished a decades-long run in which hierarchical church decisions were 
exempt from judicial review.66 
  
 55. Watson, 80 U.S. at 714.   
 56. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 522. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (suggesting an appeal to civil courts would result in 
an “appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to 
one which is less so.”); Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church 
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 
1293 (1980). 
 59. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (discussing establishment); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (discussing free exercise).  
 60. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 58, at 1292. 
 61. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727; Adams & Hanlon, supra note 58, at 1293. 
 62. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 523. 
 63. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 58, at 1294; see Watson, 80 U.S. at 726-28.  
 66. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 524. 
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Nearly a century passed before the Court revisited the principles ad-
dressed in Watson.67  In 1969, Presbyterian Church in the United States v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church once again pre-
sented the issue of how best to resolve a dispute between local churches and 
their governing national church.68  This time, however, the Court explicitly 
relied on the First Amendment in reaching its decision.69  In Blue Hull, the 
Court began by affirming Watson’s holding that the common law departure-
from-doctrine approach was impermissible, this time grounding the holding 
in the First Amendment prohibition on religious establishments.70  The pri-
mary purpose of the establishment clause was to “prevent the development of 
structural relationships between religious organizations and government 
which are vulnerable to abuse.”71  The Court found that the departure-from-
doctrine approach would require courts “to determine matters at the very core 
of a religion.”72  Requiring courts to make such determinations would almost 
certainly create the sort of structural relationship the establishment clause was 
meant to avert.73  The Court also affirmed civil court jurisdiction over church 
property disputes, holding that “[c]ivil courts do not inhibit free exercise of 
religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church prop-
erty.”74  But the Court departed from Watson in one significant way.75  The 
Court introduced and endorsed, in dicta, the use of neutral principles of law 
so as to avoid “‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded.”76  In-
stead, the Court indicated that subjecting churches to the same standards as 
other voluntary associations in matters of contract, property, and trust law 
would be entirely consistent with the First Amendment.77 
Blue Hull, however, did not squarely reject the rule of compulsory def-
erence to the church hierarchy endorsed in Watson, leading to widespread 
confusion in lower federal and state courts.78  Justice William J. Brennan 
attempted to address this confusion in his concurrence in Maryland and Vir-
ginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 
  
 67. Id. 
 68. 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969). 
 69. Id. at 444-45.  
 70. Id. at 450.  
 71. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 519. 
 72. Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 450. 
 73. See Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 520. 
 74. Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id.; Adams &Hanlon, supra note 58, at 1295. 
 78. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 58, at 1295-96. 
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which would become the basis for the “neutral principles” doctrine the Court 
would later endorse in the leading case of Jones.79  
Brennan’s concurrence laid out what has been called the “nondetermina-
tionist” approach.80 Joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, the opinion 
suggested that civil courts had the choice of following the deferential ap-
proach endorsed by Watson, the neutral principles approach mentioned in 
Blue Hull, or a third approach, by passing statutes “governing church prop-
erty arrangements in a manner that precludes state interference in doctrine.”81  
The only hard and fast rule would be the continued prohibition on civil court 
intrusion on ecclesiastical policy or doctrinal issues.82  
After nearly a century of silence on the issue, the decade long flurry of 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the role of civil courts in resolving relig-
ious disputes culminated in the 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf.83  In Jones, 
the Court faced the question of “whether civil courts, consistent with the First 
Amendment . . . may resolve [a church property] dispute on the basis of ‘neu-
tral principles of law’ or whether they must defer to the resolution of an 
authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church.”84  The Court held that the 
First Amendment does not require deferring to the highest authoritative tribu-
nal of a hierarchical church.85  To the contrary, the Court openly endorsed use 
of the neutral principles of law approach as a way of avoiding excessive en-
tanglement in ecclesiastical affairs.86   
In support of the neutral principles approach, the Court noted three dis-
tinct advantages of the method.87  First, it possessed the advantage of being 
entirely “secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all 
forms of religious organization and polity.”88  Second, that it “relie[d] exclu-
sively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law famil-
iar to lawyers and judges.”89  The Court noted that this reliance on traditional 
property and trust law would “free civil courts completely from entangle-
ment” in matters of religious doctrine.90  Finally, the Court noted that proper 
application of the neutral principles approach would accurately “reflect the 
  
 79. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 
Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Jones v. Wolf, 
443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). 
 80. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 526. 
 81. Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 368-70.  
 82. Id. at 370. 
 83. 443 U.S. 595 
 84. Id. at 597 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 602. 
 86. Id. at 603. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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intentions of the parties.”91  The Court suggested that “[t]hrough appropriate 
reversionary clauses and trust provisions” a church could plan for a particular 
contingency, thereby “ensur[ing] that a dispute over the ownership of church 
property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members.”92   
In response to the dissent’s assertion that a rule of compulsory deference 
is required “to protect the free exercise rights of those who have formed the 
association and submitted themselves to its authority,” the majority contem-
plated a myriad of ways in which the parties could reflect their intent to be 
bound by the national church.93  The split between courts can be traced to this 
one particularly vexing paragraph of dicta in Jones.  It states: 
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to “inhibit” the free 
exercise of religion. . . . Under the neutral-principles approach, the 
outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained.  At any 
time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so de-
sire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the 
church property.  They can modify the deeds or the corporate char-
ter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general 
church.  Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be 
made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational 
church.  The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal.  
And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indi-
cated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cogni-
zable form.94 
While endorsing the use of neutral principles of law that are embodied in 
“some legally cognizable form,” Justice Blackmun also suggested that if a 
church were to modify its constitution to “recite an express trust in favor of 
the denominational church,” that civil courts would be mandated to give it 
such effect.95   
These ambiguous statements have been the focus of the two alternative 
interpretations of the “neutral principles” that have led to such a deep divide 
in lower courts.  As the following two sections show, some courts have inter-
preted this dicta as requiring courts to enforce language in a denomination’s 
governing documents that asserts a trust absent traditional requirements of 
state trust and property law.96  Others have emphasized Jones’ rejection of the 
idea that courts are required to “defer to the resolution of an authoritative 
tribunal of the hierarchical church,” or to denominational “laws and regula-
  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 603-04. 
 93. Id. at 605-06 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94. Id. at 606. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.   
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tions.”97  Instead, these courts have mandated that trusts are only enforceable 
if “embodied in some legally cognizable form” under that state’s law.98 
B.  Lower Court Decisions in the Wake of Jones v. Wolf 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ ambiguity as to how to apply 
neutral principles of law – especially in situations in which the denomination 
has purported to create an express trust in its constitution – has created a na-
tion-wide split among lower courts.  Presently, five state supreme courts and 
the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law, have held that the neutral princi-
ples approach requires courts to apply the state’s property and trust law just 
as it would with any other voluntary association (referred to as “strict” neutral 
principles jurisdictions).99  Conversely, three state supreme courts have inter-
preted the neutral principles to require enforcing trust language in a denomi-
nation’s constitutional documents without inquiring as to whether a trust was 
created under the generally applicable state trust and property law (referred to 
as “hybrid” neutral principles jurisdictions).100   
1.  “Strict” Neutral Principles Jurisdictions 
Courts following the “strict” neutral principles approach generally fol-
low a two-step analysis in determining who holds title to the church prop-
erty.101  First, the court examines the deed to the property to establish who 
holds title and “whether there are any reverter clauses, express trusts, condi-
tions, or restrictions attached to the property.”102  If the title is vested in the 
local church and no restrictions are present in the title, the court proceeds to 
  
 97. Jones, 443 U.S. at 597, 609. 
 98. Id. at 606; see infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 
1995); St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the 
United Methodist Church, Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 553 (Alaska 2006); Ark. Presbytery of 
the Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 306-07 (Ark. 2001); 
Berthiaume v. McCormack, 891 A.2d 539, 547 (N.H. 2006); In re Church of St. 
James the Less, 888 A.2d 795, 805-06 (Pa. 2005); All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. 
Protestant Episcopal Church, 685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009). 
 100. See In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 69 (Cal. 2009); Rector, War-
dens & Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of 
Ga., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237, 253-54 (Ga. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 2439 (2012); 
Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., 719 
S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ga. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (2012); Episcopal Diocese 
of Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 2008); The Episcopal Church in the 
Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss, 28 A.3d 302 (Conn. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2773 
(2012). 
 101. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 543-44. 
 102. Id. at 544. 
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the second step, determining if the national church controls the local church 
(the grantee).103  If, as in Gashland, the grantee is a corporation, the court 
looks to the articles of incorporation and by-laws to determine whether the 
local church conveyed a beneficial interest to the denomination.104  Absent 
evidence of an intent to convey an interest in the property, the property re-
mains with the local church.105  The Gashland decision is a typical example 
of how this interpretation is applied.106 
2. “Hybrid” Neutral Principles Jurisdictions 
A “hybrid” neutral principles analysis generally occurs when title is 
clearly vested in the local church, meaning that the local church is the only 
entity listed on the deed.107  Unlike the strict title doctrine, the courts in these 
jurisdictions look outside of traditional trust and property law to find implied 
or express trusts based solely on finding that either “the national organization, 
the local church, or the grantor of the property intended that the property be 
dedicated to the particular denomination as defined by the national 
church.”108  Oftentimes the denominational documents supporting such con-
clusions do not support the creation of a trust under state law.109  Such evi-
dence often includes “reference to the denomination in the deeds of the prop-
erty; reference to the denomination in the articles of incorporation, charter, or 
by-laws of the local entity[] . . . and other provisions in the charter, constitu-
tion, or discipline of the national church.”110   
The recent case of Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge 
Presbyterian Church111 presents a typical example of how courts interpret 
Jones as mandating enforcement of language in a denomination’s constitution 
that unilaterally declares an express trust.112  Much like Gashland, this case 
  
 103. Id. at 544-45.  
 104. Id. at 545; see, e.g., Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 
364 S.W.3d 575, 591-92 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012), transfer denied.  
 105. See, e.g., Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 592.  In cases in which the local church is 
divided into factions or there is a question as to who controls the local corporate en-
tity, most courts follow the presumption of majority control suggested in Jones.  Ger-
stenblith, supra note 53, at 546. 
 106. See infra Part IV. 
 107. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 537; see, e.g., Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 581-
82. 
 108. Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 537. 
 109. See id. at 537-38. 
 110. Id. at 538. 
 111. 719 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (2012). 
 112. Id. at 457-58.  The court below found for the local church and adopted the 
“strict title” interpretation of the neutral principles.  Id. at 450.  In the court of ap-
peals’ decision, it characterized PCUSA as unilaterally imposing the trust provision.  
Id.  The Supreme Court rejected this characterization, stating “Timberridge’s act of 
 
12
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involved the PCUSA and the property-trust clause in Section G 8.0201 of the 
Book of Order.113  The court began its discussion by dismissing the probative 
value of the deeds, which were vested in the local church and did not show 
any intent by the grantors to create a trust.114  Instead, the court relied on the 
passage from Jones115 that suggested the recitation of an express trust in favor 
of the denomination, if embodied in a national church’s constitution, must be 
enforced by a court.116  The court explicitly eschewed traditional state law 
rules regarding trusts when it stated “the fact that a trust was not created un-
der our state’s generic express (or implied) trust statutes does not preclude the 
implication of a trust on church property under the neutral principles of law 
doctrine.”117  In place of traditional trust law, the court resolved the conflict 
on the reasoning that the national church’s property-trust clause, in combina-
tion with the local church’s articles of incorporation, created an implied trust 
in favor of the national church.118 
C.  Church Property Disputes in Missouri 
For the better part of the 20th century, Missouri adhered to the rule of 
deference set forth in Watson. 119  However, following the Supreme Court of 
the United States’ decisions in Blue Hull and Jones, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri adopted the neutral principles approach as the sole method for reso-
lution of church property disputes in Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. 
Jaeggi.120  
Elijah Parish, like Gashland, dealt with a local church that unanimously 
voted to disaffiliate with the larger denomination.121  In this case, the national 
church acknowledged that looking strictly to Missouri trust law, no trust rela-
tionship was created.122  Instead, the national church attempted to persuade 
the court to side with the other states that had chosen to adopt the deferential 
  
affiliating with the PCUSA in 1983 with the trust provision already in its governing 
constitution demonstrated that Timberridge assented to that relinquishment of its 
property rights[.]”  Id. at 456.   
 113. Id. at 458; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 114. Timberridge, 719 S.E.2d at 451. 
 115. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 116. Timberridge, 719 S.E.2d at 453. 
 117. Id. at 454. 
 118. Id. at 458. 
 119. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 579, 580 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (citing Hayes v. Manning, 172 S.W. 897, 904-06 (Mo. 1914) 
(en banc)). 
 120. Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. 
1984) (en banc). 
 121. Id. at 466. 
 122. Id. at 473. 
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approach still permitted by Jones.123  The Supreme Court of Missouri dis-
missed this argument stating that the neutral principles of law could be used 
to settle church property disputes regardless of the structure of the denomina-
tion.124  Despite rejecting the deferential approach, the court left open the 
possibility that alterations to the denomination’s Book of Order could result 
in a victory for the national church under the neutral principles approach.125  
Specifically, it left open the possibility that a trust might be created by the 
insertion of trust language in the denomination’s governing documents.126 
A little more than a decade later in Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. 
Graham,127 the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law, was faced with how to 
handle a property-trust clause in a denomination’s constitution that required 
all associated local churches to hold title to their property in trust for the de-
nomination.128  Much like in Elijah Parish, the denomination did not contrib-
ute any funds toward the purchase of the property or ever exert control over 
the property.129  Furthermore, the deeds vested title only in the local church 
and the local church’s articles of incorporation were explicit in its assertion of 
independence from any higher church body.130  In the end, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that upon examining the language of the deed, the local church’s 
articles of incorporation, and the actions of the local church in relation to the 
denomination, the local church “existed in an ‘independent relationship 
with’” the denomination.131  Upon establishing this fact, the court was able to 
bypass much of the neutral principles application in regard to the property-
trust clause because it determined that the church was not even bound by the 
denomination’s ecclesiastical decisions – a realm in which the civil courts are 
not to venture – no less decisions regarding church property.132  Thus, the 
court never made it to the question of whether the property-trust clause in the 
denomination’s constitution created a trust relationship with the local church 
absent the normal requirements of Missouri trust and property law.133   
  
 123. Id. at 466-67, 471. 
 124. Id. at 467. 
 125. Id. at 474 (“In order for the national church to prevail under the neutral prin-
ciples approach on the instant record it must do so on the basis of the Book of Or-
der.”).  The court never reached this point in their reasoning because the property trust 
clause was not adopted until after the local church had split from the denomination.  
See id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 54 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 128. Id. at 524. 
 129. Id. at 526. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 527. 
 132. Id.; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivo-
jevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (noting that “religious controversies are not the 
proper subject of civil court inquiry”). 
 133. See Graham, 54 F.3d 522. 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Writing for the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, 
Judge Alok Ahuja first addressed the issue of whether to follow the rule of 
deference or neutral-principles approach in resolving the dispute.134  The 
court determined that, under Elijah Parish, Missouri had adopted the neutral 
principles approach as the exclusive means of resolving church property dis-
putes.135  Under Elijah Parish, the court must “rel[y] ‘exclusively on objec-
tive, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers 
and judges.’”136   
Before addressing Heartland’s arguments, the court recognized that 
there was no declaration that applying a strict application of Missouri trust 
law would result in the creation of a trust relationship between Heartland and 
Gashland.137  Instead, Heartland attempted to show that, under Jones and 
Elijah Parish, Missouri trust law was not applicable.138 
The court rejected Heartland’s first assertion that Gashland’s Articles of 
Agreement and amended By Laws, viewed alongside PCUSA’s Book of Or-
der, established that Gashland held the disputed property in trust for 
PCUSA.139  In an attempt to frame the dispute as ecclesiastical, and off limits 
to civil courts,140 Heartland argued Gashland’s Articles of Agreement, which 
specified that Gashland was “connected with and ecclesiastically subject to” 
PCUSA, established that Gashland agreed to be bound by all of the provi-
sions of the denomination's present and future constitutions.141  In rejecting 
this argument, the court noted that in Elijah Parish, the court did not take into 
consideration the structure, hierarchical or congregational, of the church.142  
The court also noted that property disputes did not implicate any ecclesiasti-
cal questions, which it defined as any matter that:  
[C]oncerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or 
the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of 
needful laws and regulations for the government of the member-
ship, and the power of excluding from such associations those 
  
 134. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 579, 
579-81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012), transfer denied. 
 135. Id. at 581.  For discussion of Elijah Parish, see supra notes 120-26 and ac-
companying text. 
 136. Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465, 473 (Mo. 
1984) (en banc) (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)). 
 137. Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 583. 
 138. Id. at 583. 
 139. Id. at 583-84, 586-87. 
 140. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696, 702 (1976). 
 141. Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 586-86. 
 142. Id. 
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deemed unworthy of membership by the legally constituted 
authorities of the church[.]143   
In interpreting Gashland’s intent to be “ecclesiastically subject to” 
PCUSA, the court applied the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or 
“the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”144  By expressing 
the church’s intent to be ecclesiastically subject to PCUSA, the court deter-
mined that Gashland’s charter intended for all non-doctrinal decisions to be 
reserved for the congregation.145 
Alternatively, Heartland asserted that the property-trust clause in the 
Book of Order alone established a trust.146  Again, the court rejected Heart-
land’s claim on the grounds that Missouri law could only make PCUSA’s 
Book of Order binding if Gashland were to give some affirmative expression 
of Gashland’s agreement to be bound.147  Finding that neither Gashland’s 
Articles of Incorporation nor amended By Laws displayed its intent to be 
bound by PCUSA in any matters that are not ecclesiastical, Heartland’s asser-
tion failed.148  The court held that under Missouri law, PCUSA’s Book of 
Order, in conjunction with Gashland’s Articles of Agreement and amended 
By Laws, established that Gashland did not hold the disputed church property 
in trust for PCUSA.149  
V.  COMMENT 
Gashland’s application of the neutral principles approach firmly places 
Missouri in the “strict” neutral principles of law camp.  This approach, com-
pared to the hybrid neutral principles advocated in Timberridge and other 
lower courts, represents the most appropriate reading of Jones for two com-
pelling reasons.  First, the primary advantages of applying the neutral princi-
ples approach, as laid out in Jones, are only advanced by Gashland’s strict 
title interpretation.  Second, Gashland’s approach is more in line with the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ First Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. The Primary Advantages of the Neutral Principles Approach 
An approach that allows the imposition of a trust relationship absent the 
traditional requirements of state trust and property law conflicts with the un-
  
 143. Id. at 586 (quoting Marr v. Galbraith, 184 S.W.2d 190, 193-94 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 1944)).  
 144. See id. at 586. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 583-84. 
 147. Id. at 591. 
 148. Id. at 586-88. 
 149. Id. at 581. 
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derlying rationale for adoption of the neutral principles approach in Jones.  
The Jones court’s enthusiasm for the neutral principles stemmed from the 
belief that by being completely secular in operation, it would free civil courts 
from entanglement in religious doctrine and that by only applying “well-
established concepts of trust and property law,” it would ensure that any dis-
pute would be resolved “in accord with the desires of the members.”150  Only 
Gashland’s application of the law furthers these advantages of the neutral 
principles approach.   
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the neutral principles approach envis-
aged in Jones was that it would create a simple framework of interpretation 
for local churches and denominations alike that would accurately reflect the 
desires of both the local and national churches.151  By viewing only deeds, 
relevant state statutes, the local church’s charter, and the denomination’s con-
stitution, it should be readily apparent to both sides if the denomination pos-
sessed a legally cognizable interest in the local church’s property.  Such an 
examination would be relatively inexpensive and allow both parties to make 
an informed decision regarding their future actions. 
The strict title approach taken in Gashland, in which any trust must 
comply with the generally applicable rules of trust law, best reflects Jones’ 
intention of applying only “well-established concepts of trust and property 
law” that were “developed for use in all property disputes.”152  The approach 
taken in “hybrid” neutral principles jurisdictions flatly rejects this straight-
forward dictate in Jones.153  The court in Timberridge, for example, explicitly 
stated that Georgia’s “generic express (or implied) trust statutes [do] not pre-
clude the implication of a trust on church property under the neutral princi-
ples of law doctrine.”154  Instead of applying state law principles used in other 
property disputes that are “familiar to lawyers and judges,” the Timberridge 
court adopts a wholly judge-made law that is applicable only in church prop-
erty disputes.155  The Timberridge court was erroneous in stating that church 
governing documents are the “sort of legal materials familiar to lawyers and 
judges.”156  To the contrary, Jones suggests that courts should rely on gener-
ally applicable rules for trust creation.157  Such an application of the neutral 
principles creates uncertainty on the part of judges, lawyers, and members of 
the church.  Such uncertainty is inconsistent with the very concept of neutral 
principles.    
  
 150. Jones v. Wolf, 433 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979). 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 599, 603. 
 153. See, e.g., Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian 
Church, 719 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (2012). 
 154. Id. at 451. 
 155. Id. at 458. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. 
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Conversely, Gashland’s reliance on tried and tested state trust and prop-
erty law is certainly familiar to judges and lawyers.  This familiarity makes 
planning for a particular contingency much simpler and more reflective on 
the parties’ true intent.  Requiring local churches to amend their deed or arti-
cles of incorporation requires minimal effort on the part of the local church 
and amounts to clear and convincing evidence that the church intended to 
confer property rights to the national church. 
In addition to giving churches certainty about the future, Jones imagined 
an application of the neutral principles that would “free civil courts com-
pletely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and prac-
tice.”158  Again, Gashland’s application of the neutral principles matches this 
vision.  By holding churches to the same rules regarding trust formation as 
other voluntary associations, the court steers clear of having to rule on any-
thing that could be construed as religious doctrine.159  Courts on the other side 
of the split, however, base their decisions solely on religious documents.  
Purporting to apply the neutral principles approach, the court in Timberridge 
found that trust language present only in the denomination’s constitution was 
sufficient to create an implied trust.160  Relying solely on the denomination’s 
constitution is tantamount to applying the compulsory deference standard 
used in Watson. While this standard is still permitted by Jones, it is mislead-
ing to purport to apply neutral principles and then give deference to the na-
tional church. 
B. The Neutral Principles Approach and Free Exercise 
In addition to being more consistent with the overall tenor of Jones, 
Gashland’s approach is more in line with the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ free exercise jurisprudence.  Gashland respects both the ability of a 
church to submit to a denomination and the ability of local churches to disaf-
filiate if there are substantial disagreements.  A church may still choose to 
expressly give a property interest in all church property by altering their deed 
or through a signed writing.  However, unlike the compulsory deference ap-
proach or the application of the neutral principles in courts such as Timber-
ridge, a strict title interpretation supports the free exercise of individuals by 
not making them beholden to the dictates of the national church.  One only 
needs to look as far as Georgia to see that churches who disagree with the 
doctrines of their denomination are forced to decide whether to exercise their 
religious conscience at the risk of losing all of their church property or sit 
quietly on the sidelines. 
  
 158. Id. 
 159. Heartland Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 579, 590 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012), transfer denied.  
 160. Timberridge, 719 S.E.2d at 451. 
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By finding trusts absent any grounding in traditional state law, courts are 
in essence giving some churches the ability to do what no other voluntary 
association may do – unilaterally create a trust.  To adopt a reading of Jones 
that would allow denominations to unilaterally take a property interest in the 
local church without following the ordinary avenues of trust creation works to 
undermine the purpose of such statutes and give some denominations powers 
not granted to any other secular or religious entity.  The result is that any 
church that chooses to affiliate with a denomination that has or could adopt a 
property-trust clause in its constitution is building its church on sinking sand.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The holding in Gashland establishes a framework for how Missouri 
courts should apply the neutral principles approach in church property dis-
putes.  By holding that the property trust clause in a denomination’s constitu-
tion cannot, standing alone, establish that the local church held property in 
trust for the denomination, the Western District sides with “strict title” appli-
cation of the neutral principles approach and deepens the divide among lower 
courts on the interpretation of Jones.161  Looking forward, Gashland estab-
lished an easy-to-apply model that other Missouri courts should implement. 
Following Gashland, local churches are now free to affiliate with the de-
nomination that most closely resembles their beliefs without the fear of losing 
decades worth of parishioner funded buildings and property.  This model will 
reduce church property litigation by holding fast to the easily recognizable 
and oft-applied principles of Missouri trust law rather than an alien and 
wholly judge-made law for use solely in church property disputes.  
 
  
 161. Gashland, 364 S.W.3d at 590. 
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